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Abstract: A differential game with asymmetric constraints on the players’ controls and an
asymmetric cost functional is considered. In this game hard geometric constraints are imposed
on the maximizer, whereas the minimizer is soft-constrained by including the control effort
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1. INTRODUCTION
Differential game is a widely acceptable model for pro-
cesses controlled by more than one agent in the con-
ditions of conflict and uncertainty. This field of ap-
plied mathematics was pioneered by Isaacs (1954 – 1955,
1965). Its cornerstones were put in place by Fleming
(1957); Berkovitz and Fleming (1957); Fleming (1961);
Berkovitz (1964); Pontryagin (1966); Krasovskii and Sub-
botin (1988). Since then, the theory and applications
of differential games demonstrated fruitful and extensive
development. This concerns a variety of types of dif-
ferential games (some dichotomic pairs are linear/non-
linear, determenistic/stochastic, continuous/discrete, an-
tagonistic/cooperative, two-person/multiple-person, zero-
sum/nonzero-sum, finite/infinite horizon, etc.), as well as
their formalizations. In this paper, we consider a determin-
istic linear two-person finite-horizon zero-sum differential
game.
The central question of the theory of such differential
games is the existence and calculation of the game value,
i.e., the equal guaranteed result of both players. Knowing
the value function allows constructing optimal strategies
by, e.g., the extremal shift procedure of Krasovskii and
Subbotin (1988). If the game value is sufficiently smooth
it can result in continuous feedback strategies, as in linear-
quadratic differential games (Bryson and Ho (1975)). Al-
ternatively, optimal strategies can be constructed in a dis-
crete scheme (Krasovskii and Subbotin (1988); Krasovskii
and Krasovskii (1994)).
Despite the maturity of the science, the game solution still
represents a challenge. If a smooth function is the game
value, it should satisfy the Isaacs partial differential equa-
tion Isaacs (1965). However, in many cases, the game value
is not smooth. This fact inspired various generalizations of
the Isaacs equation, in particular, the minimax solution of
Subbotin (1994) and differential inequalities for conjugate
derivatives (Subbotin and Tarasyev (1985)). In these works
it was proved that, subject to some assumptions, if the
function satisfies the Isaacs equation in the generalized
sense, it turns out to be the game value.
In this paper, a differential game with asymmetric control
constraints is considered. In this game, the maximizer’s
control is bounded by a hard constraint, whereas the
minimizer’s control is only soft-constrained by including
a quadratic integral control effort term into the cost func-
tional, in addition to a quadratic state term. Such a game
(see Hayoun et al. (2016)) models a special type of an
interception problem where the missile (pursuer) has a
very large lateral acceleration capability, but no thrust
capacity, whereas the target (evader) is a manned aircraft
with a limited lateral acceleration, but with thrust capac-
ity. A similar asymmetric differential game was considered
by Gutman and Leitmann (1975). The sufficient condition
is derived guaranteeing that a program maximin is the
game value. It is proved by a straightforward check of
differential inequalities of Subbotin and Tarasyev (1985).
Examples are presented where the condition is satisfied
and not satisfied.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a linear system
ẋ = A(t)x+ b(t)u + c(t)v, x(t∗) = x∗, t ∈ [t∗, tf ], (1)
where x ∈ Rn is the state vector, u and v are the scalar
players’ controls, u(·), v(·) ∈ L2[t∗, tf ]; tf is the prescribed
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final time moment; t∗ ∈ [0, tf ) is the initial time moment;
the matrix function A(t) and the vector functions b(t), c(t)
are continuous. It is assumed that the control v(·) satisfies
the hard constraint given by M > 0. Thus,
u(·) ∈ U = L2[t∗, tf ], (2)
v(·) ∈ V = {v(·) ∈ L2[t∗, tf ] : |v(t)| ≤ M, t ∈ [t∗, tf ]}.
(3)
The cost functional is
Jx = x
2









where α > 0 is the first player’s control penalty coefficient.
Let us employ the terminal projection transformation
(Bryson and Ho (1975))
z = DΦ(tf , t)x, (5)
where D = [1, 0, ..., 0] and Φ(t, t0) is the fundamental
matrix of a homogeneous system ẋ = A(t)x. By (5), the
system (1) is converted into a scalar one:
ż = h1(t)u+ h2(t)v, (6)
where h1(t) = DΦ(tf , t)b(t), h2(t) = DΦ(tf , t)c(t). The
cost functional becomes
Jz = z









The objective of this paper is calculating the value of the
differential game (6) – (7) with constraints (2) – (3).
3. GAME VALUE
3.1 Main result
Let us define the program maximin



















h2(t)dt ≥ 0, (9)
then the program maximin (8) is the value of the differen-
tial game (6) – (7) with constraints (2) – (3)
The proof consists of several stages.
3.2 Calculation of the program maximin
It is directly observed that









Due to (10) and









the program maximin is represented as






χ(u(·), v(·), λ), (12)
where



























χ(u(·), v(·), λ). (14)
The proposition is proved by a straightforward calculation
of maximizing and minimizing elements.
Due to Proposition 1, and to the fact that maximization
operators commute, the program maximin is rewritten as






χ(u(·), v(·), λ). (15)
For a fixed λ ∈ R, the maximizing function is
vλ = M signλ. (16)





By some algebra and by changing (t∗, z∗) with (t, z),
ρ(t, z) = max
λ∈R











































































, z = 0.
(18)
3.3 Properties of the program maximin
First, it is seen that the function ρ(t, z), given by (18),
satisfies the boundary condition
ρ(tf , z) = z
2. (19)
The continuity and differentiability properties of ρ(t, z) are
formulated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The function ρ(t, z) and its time derivative
∂ρ
∂t
are continuous with respect to z. The derivative
∂ρ
∂z
is continuous for z > 0 and z < 0, and has a finite
discontinuity for z = 0.
Proof. It is obtained directly from (18) that
lim
z→0+





















= ρ(t, 0). (20)

















































































































































has a finite discontinuity for z = 0. ✷
3.4 Isaacs equation
Let us write down the Isaacs partial differential equation











where the Hamiltonian H is
























ṽ = M sign(s), (29)
respectively. Due to (27) – (29),






























Proposition 3. The program maximin (18) satisfies the
Isaacs - Bellman equation (31) for z > 0 and for z < 0.
Proof. Note that due to (23),
∂ρ(t, z)
∂z
> 0 for z > 0 and
∂ρ(t, z)
∂z
< 0 for z < 0. (32)
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Similarly, it is shown that ρ(t, z) satisfies the Isaacs-
Bellman equation for z < 0. ✷
3.5 Differential inequalities
In order to prove that ρ(t, z) is the game value for
z = 0 (where
∂ρ
∂z
has discontinuity), we show that ρ(t, z)
satisfies the differential inequalities, generalizing the Isaacs
equation (Subbotin and Tarasyev (1985)). The lower and
the upper Dini directional derivatives of the function
V (t, z) are defined as
∂−V (t, z)|(1, h) = lim
δ→0
inf





∂+V (t, z)|(1, h) = lim
δ→0
sup




respectively. The lower and the upper conjugate deriva-
tives are defined as
D∗V (t, z)|s = sup
h∈R
[sh− ∂−V (t, z)|(1, h)] , (36)
and
D∗V (t, z)|s = inf
h∈R
[sh− ∂+V (t, z)|(1, h)] , (37)
The differential inequalities, generalizing the Isaacs equa-
tion, are
D∗V (t, z)|s ≥ H(t, z, s), (38)
D∗V (t, z)|s ≤ H(t, z, s), (39)
where H(t, z, s) is the Hamiltonian (30). The inequalities
(38) – (39) constitute the sufficient condition for a function
V (t, z) to be the game value (Subbotin and Tarasyev
(1985)). In the points where V (t, z) is differentiable, they
reduce to the Isaacs equation (31).
Proposition 4. If the condition (9) holds, then the program
maximin (18) satisfies the differential inequalities (38) –
(39) for z = 0.
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Thus, for s /∈ [−κ(t), κ(t)], ρ(t, z) satisfies the differential
inequality (38) at (t, 0). Let |s| ≤ κ(t). Let us show that




≥ H(t, z, s), |s| ≤ κ(t). (42)

















































The function H(t, z, s) in the right-hand side of (44) is
even and admits its global maximum for




Now, the inequality (44) holds if
s∗ ≥ κ(t). (46)















which yields (9) for t∗ = t.
The second differential inequality (39) is treated in the
same fashion. This completes the proof of the proposition.
✷
Propositions 3 – 4, along with the boundary condition (19),
prove Theorem 1.
If the condition (9) holds, then, due to (28) – (29) and
(23), the optimal strategies for z > 0 and for z < 0 are
















v0(t, z) = M sign(z). (49)
4. EXAMPLES
4.1 Scalar game with simple motions
In this example, h1(t) = h2(t) ≡ 1:
ż = u+ v. (50)
In this case, F (t) ≡ α where the function F is defined
in (9). Thus, the condition (9) holds and the program
maximin ρ(t∗, z∗) is the value of the game for the system
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(50) with the cost functional (7) and constraints (2) –
(3). By substituting (48) – (49) into (50) and by solving













(z∗ −Mα)(α+ tf − t)
α+ tf − t∗
, z∗ > 0,
−Mα+
(z∗ +Mα)(α+ tf − t)
α+ tf − t∗
, z∗ < 0.
(51)
These trajectories are symmetric w.r.t. the t-axis. For
z∗ > 0, they decrease for z∗ > Mα and increase for
0 < z∗ < Mα (see Fig. 1 where the optimal trajectories
are shown as solid lines).
t









Fig. 1. Optimal trajectories for scalar game with simple
motions: tf = 2, M = 100, α = 0.1
4.2 Pursuit-evasion game with first-order dynamics of the
players
The game in this example models a planar engagement
between two maneuvering vehicles (pursuer and evader)
with first-order controller dynamics. Subject to the as-
sumption that the heading angles and the line-of-sight
angle are small, the engagement can be described (see, e.g.,
Turetsky and Shinar (2003)) by a linear system (1) where
x = (x1, x2, x3, x4)
T , x1 is the relative separation between
the vehicles normal to the initial line-of-sight; x2 is the
relative velocity; x3 and x4 are the lateral accelerations, u
and v are the lateral acceleration commands (controls) of






0 1 0 0
0 0 −1 1
0 0 0 −1/τp




























where τp and τe are the time constants of the pursuer and
the evader, respectively. In the scalarized system (6),
h1(t) = −h(tf − t, τp), h2(t) = h(tf − t, τe), (53)
where
h(t, τ)  τ (exp(−t/τ) + t/τ − 1) . (54)
In this example, there exists a time moment t∗ ∈ (0, tf)
such that the condition (9) is valid for t ∈ [t∗, tf ] (see
the graph of the function F (t) in Fig. 2 for tf = 2,
t










Fig. 2. Function F (t) for first-order pursuer and evader
M = 100, τp = 0.2, τe = 0.1, α = 0.1: for these parameters,
t∗ = 1.04).
For z = 0, t ∈ [0, t∗), the program maximin is not the
game value. In this case, the game space S = {(t, z) : t ∈
[0, tf ], z ∈ R} is decomposed into two regions by using two
trajectories, generated by the pair (48) – (49), symmetric
w.r.t. to the axis z = 0 and tangent to it at t = t∗. These








































In Fig. 3, they are shown by bold lines, solid for t ∈ [0, t∗)
and dashed for t ∈ [t∗, tf ]. The regular region
D1 = {(t, z) : t ∈ [0, t
∗], |z| ≥ z∗(t) ∧ t ∈ [t∗, tf ], z ∈ R},
(56)
is completely covered by the trajectories generated by the
optimal strategies (48) – (49): they are shown in Fig. 3 by
thin solid lines. The singular region is D0 = S\D1.
t

















Fig. 3. Game space decomposition
Proposition 5. Any trajectory, generated by (48) – (49)
from (t∗, z∗) ∈ D0, z∗ �= 0, approaches the z = 0 axis
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(50) with the cost functional (7) and constraints (2) –
(3). By substituting (48) – (49) into (50) and by solving
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α+ tf − t∗
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(51)
These trajectories are symmetric w.r.t. the t-axis. For
z∗ > 0, they decrease for z∗ > Mα and increase for
0 < z∗ < Mα (see Fig. 1 where the optimal trajectories
are shown as solid lines).
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where τp and τe are the time constants of the pursuer and
the evader, respectively. In the scalarized system (6),
h1(t) = −h(tf − t, τp), h2(t) = h(tf − t, τe), (53)
where
h(t, τ)  τ (exp(−t/τ) + t/τ − 1) . (54)
In this example, there exists a time moment t∗ ∈ (0, tf)
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the graph of the function F (t) in Fig. 2 for tf = 2,
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and dashed for t ∈ [t∗, tf ]. The regular region
D1 = {(t, z) : t ∈ [0, t
∗], |z| ≥ z∗(t) ∧ t ∈ [t∗, tf ], z ∈ R},
(56)
is completely covered by the trajectories generated by the
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Proposition 5. Any trajectory, generated by (48) – (49)
from (t∗, z∗) ∈ D0, z∗ �= 0, approaches the z = 0 axis
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monotonically and reaches it at some moment t̄ ∈ (t∗, t
∗).
For t ∈ [t̄, t∗], it is a sliding mode trajectory along z = 0.
Proof. Let z∗ > 0. By substituting (48) – (49) into (6),









Since F (t) < 0 for t ∈ [0, t∗),
ż < 0, t ∈ [0, t∗), (58)



























Thus, if two trajectories z1(t) and z2(t) emanate from
(t∗, z∗1) and (t∗, z∗2), z∗1 < z∗2, then z1(t) < z2(t), i.e.,
the trajectory emanating from D0 cannot intersect its
boundary z = z∗(t) and reaches z = 0 at some moment
t̄ ∈ (t∗, t
∗).
Similarly, for z∗ < 0: ż > 0 for t ∈ [0, t
∗), which, along
with (58) yields zż < 0 and guarantees the sliding mode
along z = 0. ✷
Such trajectories are shown in Fig. 3 by thin dashed lines.
Once the trajectory reaches the axis z = 0 and starts the
sliding mode motion, it ceases being optimal, because the
program maximin is not a game value for z = 0, t ∈ [0, t∗).
5. CONCLUSIONS
For the differential game with a hard constraint on the
maximizer’s control and with a soft constraint on the
minimizer’s control, the sufficient condition is derived,
guaranteeing that the program maximin is the game
value. This fact is proved by a dual calculation of the
program maximin and by using the differential inequalities
generalizing the Isaacs equation.
Two examples are presented. In the scalar game with
simple motions, this condition is satisfied. In the scalar-
izable pursuit-evasion game with first-order dynamics of
the players the condition is violated at the interval of the
state variable axis. This yields the state space decompo-
sition into the regular and the singular regions. In the
regular region the program maximin is the game value and
the optimal strategies are constructed based on its space
derivative. In the singular region, all candidate optimal
trajectories approach the horizontal axis, after which the
sliding mode begins and these trajectories cease being
optimal. The problem of constructing the game value in
the singular zone is the topic of future research.
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